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State Taxation of Interstate Commerce:
Chaos and New Hope
Donald K. Barnes*
IJ

1. BACKGROUND AND SCOPE
ITH AMPLE REASON, the tax bar has for years been so pre-

occupied with federal taxation that state and local taxation have
received only scant attention. Recently, however, interest in the
state and local area, particularly because of its impact upon multistate businesses, has developed to a new high level. Federal tax
problems are still the giant, but it is recognized that state and local
problems have grown out of the pygmy stage and can no longer
be ignored.
Although much work needs
to be done in the purely local
THE AuTHOR (A.B., Harvard College,
M.B.A., New York University, LLB.,
Fordham University, S.J.D., St. John's
University) is a member of the New
York and Michigan Bars.

aspects of state and local taxation, this article is limited to

considerations pertinent to mul-

tistate business, i.e., to those
special problems which arise because a single business entity has
business contacts with more than one taxing jurisdiction. Otherwise stated, it is limited to the federal aspects of state and local
taxation, including a consideration of taxes imposed by political
subdivisions as well as by the states. The former is necessarily included as there is much multistate business which is not strictly interstate commerce.
The problems relative to state and local taxation have existed
from the inception of our federal system. However, they were
relatively insignificant until the development of efficient longdistance transportation and communication, the concomitant growth
of interstate commercial intercourse, and the burgeoning of income
and gross receipts taxes. While they have generally been far overshadowed by federal taxes since the adoption of the sixteenth amendment, they have had serious notice from taxpayers, tax administrators, writers, and courts for most of the present century. In the last
few years, they have risen to their present prominence through a
combination of factors, the most significant of which are the constantly increasing demands of all levels of government for revenue,
*The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Thomas J. Hughes, a member
of the Michigan Bar, in the preparation of this article.
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the increasing integration of the American common market, and
the increasing reluctance of the United States Supreme Court to
circumscribe state taxes on or affecting interstate commerce.
The problems involved in state and local taxation are very
broad. If they could be stated as a single problem, it would be to
find a way for multistate business to pay its share of local expenses
to the appropriate jurisdictions without imposing upon it any extra
burdens merely because of its multistate nature. As noted previously, the taxing jurisdictions involved are not only the states themselves, but also include counties, municipalities, townships, school
districts, metropolitan districts, public authorities, irrigation districts, drainage districts, and many others. The types of businesses
involved are not only the classic examples of pure interstate commerce - interstate transportation and communication, and interstate sale of tangible goods - but also businesses which though
not engaging directly in interstate commerce, significantly affect
interstate commerce. Examples of the latter type are abundant and
include, among others, manufacturing before interstate commerce
begins or selling after interstate commerce ends as well as multistate businesses which are not interstate commerce at all, as for
example hotel chains. All sorts of service industries are affected, as
are construction, publishing, and many others.
The taxes involved are not only those measured by business net
income, but also ad valorem taxes on realty, tangible personalty and
intangibles; taxes measured by gross receipts such as sales, use, and
gross income taxes and taxes measured by unit of product or service
such as cigarette taxes are also involved. Personal income taxes,
fees and taxes for special benefits such as gasoline taxes, corporation
registration fees, miscellaneous taxes such as business licenses and
taxes on capital, severance, employment, chain stores, and security
transfers also become involved in this area. Even inheritance taxes
and escheats, in their administrative aspects, and responsibility for
collecting taxes imposed upon others must be considered in any
analysis of this subject in light of the rather complex problems they
raise.
A.

The CongressionalInvestigation

Aroused by what it considered startling actions' of the Supreme
Court, Congress, in 1959, directed an investigation of net-income1. See, e.g., the decision in Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota,
358 U.S. 450 (1959), which held that a fairly apportioned net income tax may be
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based taxes,2 and in 1960 broadened it to include all taxes. This
task was assigned to the Special Subcommittee on State Taxation of
Interstate Commerce of the Committee on the Judiciary of the
House of Representatives which has been most industrious. Its
hearings on net-income-based and sales-and-use taxes of manufacturing and merchandising businesses developed transcripts of over
850 thousand words. Over 30,000 short questionnaires and 5,500
long ones were sent to taxpapers. Other questionnaires were sent
to state and local tax administrators.
In June of 1964, the Special Subcommittee released its first or
interim report.3 It constitutes the first comprehensive factual study
ever made of state taxes based on net income. Its findings are not
surprising since in general they merely confirm impressions which
tax practitioners have had for a long time. For the first time, however, there are now adequate authoritative data upon which to base
arguments for the need for reform and the directions it might take.
The number of businesses selling tangible goods across state
lines is estimated at between 120,000 and 200,000. Most of these
enterprises have places of business in only a few states, often only
one, but nevertheless sell to customers located in many states. Thus,
attributing income to the location of the customer (the "destination
sales factor" used in some apportionment formulae) requires returns
to be filed in, and audited by, many states with which the taxpayer
has only minimal contact. One result is that tax liabilities are
often less than the cost of full compliance or the cost of complete
administration. The complexities of the mass of laws, regulations,
judicial interpretations, and administrative practices, taken together,
are staggering. Definitions of income, rules for its allocation and
formulae for its apportionment4 vary widely and bewilderingly.
imposed upon pure interstate commerce conducted through a sales office in the state;
the refusal to review Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. Collector of Revenue, 234 La.

651, 101 So. 2d 70 (1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 28 (1959); International Shoe Co.
v. Fontenot, 236 La. 279, 107 So. 2d 640, cert. denied, 359 U.S. 984 (1959), in which
the Supreme Court of Louisiana upheld imposition of an income tax upon businesses
which had nothing but traveling salesmen in the state; Scripto, Inc. v. Carson, 362
U.S. 207 (1960), which held that a foreign vendor could be held responsible for collecting use tax on transactions through an independent manufacturers' agent in the
state.
2. 73 Star. 555 (1959), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 381 (Supp. V, 1964). Title I of the
same act imposed a limit on state jurisdiction to tax interstate commerce.
3. Special Subcommittee of the House Judiciary Comm., State Taxation of Interstate
Commerce, H.R. REP. No. 1480, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964). [hereinafter cited as
Congressional Report].
4. The term "allocation" refers to direct assignment of specific types of income to a
particular location, as for example rents to the situs of the property. The term "appor-
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This is extremely burdensome to large enterprises and impossible
for small ones with widely dispersed activities.
The overlapping rules for allocation and apportionment tend
toward overtaxation, although there are sometimes gaps which
permit undertaxation. In actual practice, however, there is much
more undertaxation than overtaxation since so many taxpayers
escape the hopeless confusion by simple failure to comply. For that
same reason, actual current compliance costs are not excessively
high.
Insofar as apportionment formulae are concerned, the Congressional Report lays most of the fault to the sales factor, particularly if it is customer-oriented. Sales are always troublesome, but
much more so when attributed to the situs of the customer ("destination sales") than when attributed to the office through which the
sale is made ("sales through offices") or the situs of the goods at
the time of sale ("sales from inventory"). Property and payroll
factors cause little trouble because they are easily located, and for
most taxpayers, are in relatively few jurisdictions.
Perhaps the biggest surprise in the Congressional Report is its
finding that choice of an apportionment formula has very little
impact upon the revenue of any state.a The greatest difference between the most and least "favorable" formula for any state is less
than one and a half per cent of total revenues.
The Congressional Report notes that efforts to achieve an end
to the chaos by state action have been barren of significant results
and hold no promise for the future. It therefore concludes that a
federally imposed uniformity would be beneficial to both business
and the states. It is stated: "Certainly, the problems presented are
not easy problems, but they are important problems. They are important to the States and they are important to the vitality of the
American common market. Congress has a responsibility to both,
and it is time for it to seek a solution. ''4b The Special Subcommittee, of course, is not stopping with this initial report. It has promised a second and final report for June 1965. Again there will
be two volumes: the first will contain a factual study of sales, use,
gross receipts, and capital stock taxes, and the second some legislative recommendations containing the substance of a proposed fedtionment" refers to division of income by percentages based upon a variety of factors
such as locations of property, payroll, sales, ton-miles, and others.
4a. The same is not true of tax costs to individual taxpayers.
4b. Congressional Report, supra note 3 at 5999.
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eral statute regulating some aspects of state and local taxation of
multistate business. Although the recommendation will presumably fall far short of the detail necessary to achieve complete uniformity in all phases of the subject, it will almost certainly be far
more comprehensive than the present stop-gap Interstate Income
Law.!
B.

Other Attempts at Uniformity

Long before Congress interested itself in the problems involved
in state and local taxation of interstate commerce, others had recognized them and made futile efforts toward their solution. For many
years, numerous scholars and practitioners have urged that the states
adopt uniform definitions and formulae. The largest of these
efforts is the Uniform Division of Income for Tax Purposes Act,
developed in 1957 by the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws. The Uniform Act has been approved by
the American Bar Association and has been adopted in substance
by Alaska, Arkansas, Kansas, Indiana, and, most recently, Oregon,
Idaho, New Mexico, North Dakota, and the District of Columbia.
Motivation for the 1965 state enactments may be traced to the activities of the Congressional Special Subcommittee, and action in
the District of Columbia is forced by the decision in General Motors
Corp. v.District of Columbia.6
The Uniform Act was designed so that it could be easily adopted
by the states, thus achieving the objective of uniformity rather than
establishment of a theoretically ideal system. The act has been
severely criticized, principally for its incorporation of a destination
sales factor. It does not attempt to define income, but rather prescribes that certain income - rents, royalties, interest, dividends, and
capital gains - shall be directly allocated, along with its related
expenses, with the rest apportioned by equally weighted factors of
tangible property (including rented property) payroll, and sales
(assigned to the location of the customer). Having created a "nexus"
problem by attributing income to the location of the customer who
may be and often is in a state which cannot obtain jurisdiction over
the taxpayer, the act fails to offer any definition of "nexus." To
make sure that no income escapes tax, it directs that income which
the formula ascribes to states in which the taxpayer is "not taxable"
shall be brought back to the state of the taxpayer's headquarters.
5. 73 Stat. 555 (1959), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 381 (Supp. V, 1964). For a further
discussion of this law see p. 871 infra.
6. 380 U.S. 553 (1965).
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It contemplates the businesses of manufacturing and merchandising,
but contains no provisions for the special problems of other industries such as construction, publishing, broadcasting, finance, insurance, transportation, and communication.
Less ambitious undertakings have been more successful in
their limited fields. For several years, many western states have
had an interstate compact covering taxation of highway carriers.7
Under this compact, the tax obligations of an interstate trucking
business are divided among the participating states in a manner
thought to be fair to each, avoiding both overlaps and gaps.
The results are satisfactory to both states and the truckers. Unfortunately, this precedent has not been widely followed. However,
Congress has recently consented to two interstate compacts entered
into by northeastern states for the proration on a mileage basis of
fuel taxes and registration fees imposed upon bus operators, and has
directed the District of Columbia to join.8
Since the states have shown no eagerness to agree upon uniform
rules, and especially a reasonable apportionment formula, much interest has been displayed in having one federally imposed. Individual Justices of the Supreme Court, despairing erection of a. coherent set of rules through ad hoc decisions, have frequently remarked that the problem is peculiarly susceptible to legislative
rather than judicial solution. Congress is just now getting around
to accepting the invitation.
II.

CONSTITUTIONAL

RULES IN

THE ABSENCE OF

STATUTE

A.

The Principles

There are three constitutional factors which influence what
states and their subdivisions may do in the absence of action by Congress.' ° The first is the basic principle that authority of a state is
7. Rosenberg, Licensing Interstate Vehicles: State Cooperation in Federal Intervention,
11 VAND. L. REV. 1007 (1958).
8. 79 Stat. 58 (1965).
9. E.g., Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292 (1944).
10. The analysis which follows is necessarily an oversimplication. For a thorough
background the reader is referred to BEAMAN, PAYING TAXES TO OTHER STATES
(1963); HARTMAN, STATE TAXATION OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE (1953).
Even
the latter must be read in connection with later cases, especially General Motors Corp.
v. Washington, 377 U.S. 436, rehearing denied, 379 U.S. 875 (1964). See also A
Symposium on State Taxation of Interstate Commerce, 46 VA. L. REV. 1051 (1960);
Note, Federal Limitation on State Taxation of Interstate Business, 75 HARv. L. REV.
953 (1962).
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limited to its geographical territory and therefore it may not tax
persons, things, or events not within its own boundaries." Since
adoption of the fourteenth amendment, this principle has been incorporated into the concept of due process which may not be withheld by the states.12 Under due process, sometimes aided by the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, this principle
has been enlarged a bit - at least until recently" - to require
some degree of reasonableness in the relationship between the measure of the tax and the things taxed.' 4
The second constitutional consideration is this same point developed under state constitutions, plus other state constitutional requirements such as uniformity in rates of tax and assessment. Although instances are extremely rare in which courts have given taxpayers the benefit of state due process and equal protection requirements, there are exceptions.' 5
The third constitutional factor is the familiar but confusing interstate commerce clause. Article I, section 8 of the federal constitution confers upon Congress the power to regulate commerce
among the states. This, apparently, was one of the principal reasons for abandoning the original Articles of Confederation and replacing them with our present Constitution.'" Once the Supreme
Court had decided that taxation is a form of regulation,' 7 it might
have concluded either that the grant of regulatory power to Congress was exclusive and that hence the states could not tax interstate
commerce at all, or on the other hand, that the power was concurrent so that the states could regulate (including tax) in any manner
not forbidden by Congress. Hindsight makes it easy to see that had
the Court adopted either of these all-or-nothing approaches, the
present chaos could have been averted. Congress would have been
compelled either to permit taxation sufficient to make interstate
commerce pay its way, i.e., remove any constitutional discrimination
in favor of interstate commerce, or, on the other tack, to lay down
rules to prevent discrimination against interstate commerce. It
11. New York, Lake Erie & W.R.R. v. Pennsylvania, 153 U.S. 628 (1894).
12. Miller Brothers Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340 (1954).
13. General Motors Corp. v. Washington, 377 U.S. 436 (1964). See discussion of
this case at pp. 868-71 infra.
14. Wisconsin v. J. C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435 (1940); Hans Rees' Sons Inc. v.
North Carolina, 283 U.S. 123 (1931).
15. Los Angeles v. Belridge Oil Co., 48 Cal. 2d 320, 309 P.2d 417 (1957).
16. Joseph v. Carter & Weekes Stevedoring Co., 330 U.S. 422 (1947).
17. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U. S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
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would have had to do something to define the extent to which and
the manner in which states and their subordinate jurisdictions may
tax interstate commerce, matters affecting interstate commerce, and
multistate business.
The Supreme Court did neither, but rather chose a middle course
which the Court, as well as lower courts and practitioners, found
extremely difficult to follow. The commerce clause, said the Court,
is a self-executing restraint upon the powers of states to interfere
with interstate commerce or impose discriminatory or undue burdens upon it. As one can see now, this relatively simple principle
has led to unending complexities, confusion, and conflicts. Life
would have been much easier for taxpayers, tax administrators, and
courts had the Court chosen either of the other approaches. A reasonable synthesis of all but the latest decisions is: states may not tax
the privilege of engaging in interstate commerce, 8 nor its inseparable local incidents, 9 unless such incidents are tied in with intrastate commerce, 20 or are sufficiently extensive to be assimilated to
intrastate commerce, 2' nor may they discriminate against interstate
commerce, 22 nor subject it to multiple burdens;23 but they may tax
its net income,2 4 its property,25 its capital, 26 even though property or
capital be measured by value imparted by extra-state connections,'
its use of local facilities,- or its payrolls. 1
B.

Application of the Principles

The application of these principles to the concrete facts of an
individual case is a problem of an entirely different order."0 The
18. Spector Motor Service Inc. v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602 (1951).
19. Nippert v. Richmond, 327 U. S. 416 (1946); Alpha Portland Cement Co. v.
Massachusetts, 268 U.S. 203 (1929).
20. Norton Co. v. Department of Revenue, 340 U.S. 534 (1951).
21. Field Enterprises, Inc. v. Washington, 352 U.S. 806 (1956), affirming per
curiam 47 Wash. 2d 852, 289 P.2d 1010 (1955).
22. Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Reily, 373 U.S. 64 (1963).
23. Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249 (1946).
24. Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450 (1959).
25. Adams Express Co. v. Ohio, 166 U. S. 185 (1897).
26. Ford Motor Co. v. Beauchamp, 308 U.S. 331 (1939).
27. Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. Virginia, 358 U. S. 434 (1959).
28. Central Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Mealey, 334 U.S. 653 (1948).
29. This subject is aided by a federal statute. See, e.g., International Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). The unemployment compensation statute expressly provided that interstate commerce should noe be a defense. INT. REV. CODE OF
1954 § 3305(a).
30. See, e.g., Mr. Justice Clark's opinion in Northwestern States Portland Cement Co.
v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 452 (1959). Mr. Justice Black has expressed the view
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Business and Occupation Tax imposed by the State of Washington 3
looked like a tax on the privilege of engaging in interstate commerce, and for that reason and because unapportioned was held to
be invalid.12 Nevertheless, its application to another taxpayer whose
33
business appeared to be pure interstate commerce was approved;
it further survived an attack by another taxpayer who claimed that
it should be apportioned and who proved what a proper apportionment would be. 4 Although it was once decided3 5 and has since
seemed to be assumed36 that a tax must be properly apportioned, the
Court has been extremely slow to find fault with an apportionment
formula, or even, as in the later Washington cases, with the absence
of any apportionment. Nevertheless, some apportionments will be
held improper. The so-called "apportionment" must not be unduly
arbitrary, 37 nor such as to impose multiple burdens, directly and obviously, upon interstate commerce. If it is too distorted, it may
violate due process by taxing extraterritorial values. Those are the
principles, but in only one case has the Supreme Court applied them
to the taxpayer's advantage.3" In that case the taxpayer demonstrated by a species of separate accounting that income arising from
activities within the taxing state was considerably less than the formula attributed. Notwithstanding a similar demonstration, California was permitted to tax a portion of the net income of a chain
store operator although its California operations produced a net
loss.39 A very recent decision suggests that an unreasonable apporin dissenting opinions that the commerce clause is not self-executing as a restraint on
the states, e.g., Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen, 304 U.S. 307, 316 (1938); and that the
fourteenth amendment was not adopted to protect corporations and should not be so
applied, e.g., Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 303 U.S. 77, 83 (1938). Mr.
Justice Douglas joined him in the latter view in Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337
U.S. 562, 576 (1949), which is a most unusual case in that the taxpayer prevailed on
the sole ground of "equal protection."
31. WASH. Rnv. CODE ANN. § 82.04.270 (1961).
32. Gwin, White & Prince, Inc. v. Henneford, 305 U.S. 434 (1939).
33. Field Enterprises, Inc. v. Washington, 352 U.S. 806, affirming per curiam
47 Wash. 2d 852, 289 P.2d 1010 (1955).
34. United States Steel Corp. v. Washington, 316 P.2d 1099, appeal dismissed, 358
U.S. 46 (1958).
35. Hans Rees' Sons, Inc. v. North Carolina, 283 U. S. 123 (1931).
36. Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450 (1959).
37. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Joseph, 307 N.Y. 342, 121 N.E.2d 360 (1954). The New
York City Business and Financial tax prescribed factors for an apportionment formula,
and then directed that if application of those factors attributed less than one-third of
the income to the city, one-third should nevertheless be taxed. The New York Court

of Appeals struck down the one-third floor.
38. Hans Rees' Sons, Inc. v. North Carolina, 283 U.S. 123 (1931).
39. Butler Bros. v. McColgan, 315 U.S. 501 (1942).
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tionment will be held constitutionally infirm.4" The actual decision was that the District of Columbia Income and Franchise Tax
Act,4 ' in directing the District Commissioners to apportion to the
District that part of net income which is "fairly attributable" to it,
does not permit the District to tax 100 per cent of the income arising from the segment of a taxpayer's business conducted both within and without the District. The language of the opinion uses terms
appropriate to both interstate commerce and due process considerations.
C.

Impact of General Motors v. Washington

As noted previously, all prior decisions must be read in light
of General Motors Corp. v. Washington. One noted authority has
made the following comments in this respect:
Contrary to expectations, the opinion in General Motors Corporation v. State of Washington did not darify the Court's views
on the extent to which the Commerce Clause protects interstate
transactions from multiple gross receipts tax burdens, although the
case presented facts which were, in most respects, ideal for an exposition of views on that subject. The tax was imposed upon

the privilege of engaging in business activities within Washington.
Its measure was the gross proceeds of sales. The sales whose gross
proceeds were taxed were made pursuant to orders received and
accepted at offices of the seller outside of Washington. The goods
sold were manufactured in states other than Washington and
shipped from points outside of Washington to vendees (automobile dealers) located in Washington. The tax was applied to all
sales to Washington destinations regardless of whether there was
much, little or no business activity with respect to such sales within

Washington. The taxpayer had volunteered the tax with respect
to sales "channeled through" a Seattle office, and the lower Wash-

ington court had held that certain other sales were taxable because
they were related to a Seattle office. The bulk of the 42sales in
issue, however, were unrelated to any Washington office.

Most authorities expected that the General Motors decision
would clarify the Court's position on the major issues existing in
this area.43 First, there was the issue that at least with respect to
the sales unrelated to Washington offices, the tax appeared to be
levied upon the privilege of engaging in interstate activities, seemingly in contravention of the position taken in Spector Motor Service
40. General Motors Corp. v. District of Columbia, 380 U.S. 553 (1965).
41. D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 47-1571,-1571(a) (1961).
42. Letter From Mr. Walter H. Beaman of the New York Bar to the Author, March
12, 1965.
43. Ibid.
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44 which was strongly reaffirmed in Northwestern
Inc. v. O'Connor,

States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota,4 5 that no state may tax
that privilege. "Second, the tax exposed the interstate sales to multiple taxation in every state with which they had any relation, such
as Oregon, where the sales office was located, and Michigan, California and Missouri, where the manufacture of the goods took
place."4 6 In fact, there was evidence that showed that in St. Louis,
Missouri, a gross receipts tax had been imposed on some of the sales
which were in turn taxed in Washington. "Third, the tax was unapportioned and its imposition on the total gross receipts of the interstate sales seemed to contravene the requirements of fair apporFourth,
tionment laid down in the Northwestern States opinion."4
the General Motors case involved "no local or intrastate incident of
the type that had been previously used as a peg on which to hang a
tax from one end or another of an interstate transaction (e.g., local
manufacturing, or the making of a contract of sale within the
state)."" One authority has commented on the matter of interpreting the General Motors decision as follows:
The difficulty of assaying the precedential effect of the majority's opinion lies principally in the fact that the result reached
cannot be reconciled with the basic principles just mentioned,
yet three of the four rules were restated in their classic form.
First, the Court repeated the proposition that a state may not
levy a tax on the privilege of engaging in interstate commerce;
yet it sustained a privilege tax on the transactions in issue, which
were dearly not intrastate commerce. Second, the majority stated
that "we have specifically held that interstate commerce cannot be
subjected to the burden of 'multiple taxation,"' yet the judgment
of the Court sustained a Washington tax on transactions which
were exposed to taxation in Oregon, California, Michigan and
Missouri, and which were shown to have been subjected to a
gross receipts levy in St. Louis. Third, the Court, after citing the
proposition that "it is well established that taxation measured by
gross receipts is constitutionally proper [only] if it is fairly apportioned," sustained the tax on an unapportioned basis, though it
was obvious that the business activity within the state was minuscule in relation to the total business activity that produced the
entire gross receipts from the sales in issue.
The result reached by the majority in this case was constructed
upon a novel extension of the "local incident" exception to the
44.

340 U.S. 602 (1951).

45. 358 U.S. 450 (1959).
46. Letter From Mr. Walter H. Beaman of the New York Bar to the Author, March
12, 1965.

47. Ibid.
48. Ibid.
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prohibtion against taxation of the unapportioned gross receipts
from commerce which crosses state lines. Previously, Norton Co.
v. Department of Revenae4" had represented the farthest reach
of the local incident doctrine. That case held that where a
local place of business was engaging in activities which had traditionally been treated as taxable local (intrastate) incidents of
interstate commerce, such as the delivery of goods from local
stocks or the acceptance of orders locally received, other transactions clearly interstate in nature might become "tainted" by a
connection with the intrastate business to an extent that it might
be constitutionally impossible to separate nontaxable interstate
gross receipts from the receipts of the taxable intrastate activities.
Though citing the Norton case as a precedent, the majority went
far beyond the facts of that case and actually disregarded its holding, since there was not in Washington any place of business or
business activity connected with the sales in issue which could
qualify as a vortex of intrastate business activity under Norton.
Even the dubious conclusion that the homes of General Motors
employees in Washington were offices of General Motors would
not serve this purpose, since the business (if any) carried on
at those homes was exclusively in aid of General Motors' interstate commerce, rather than a separable intrastate activity, and
in any event would seem to be negligible in proportion to the
total business activity which earned the gross income that was
fully taxed. 50
From the foregoing analysis, it would appear that "the Court
left intact those of the classic propositions concerning the protection
which the commerce clause affords in gross receipts tax cases, yet
used the local incident rule to reach a result which favored the
application of the tax in circumstances that appeared to violate all
three of those canons."' This potentiality has always been "present
in the local incident doctrine, as Mr. Justice Rutledge pointed out in
his concurring opinion in Freeman v. Hewit.... The real meaning
of the majority's opinion in the General Motors case appears to
be that when the five justices for whom Mr. Justice Clark wrote
feel that a tax of the Washington type has not actually curtailed
interstate commerce, they will extend the local incident doctrine
as far as words can be stretched to sustain the constitutional validity

of the tax.

52

The Court, however, has recently considered a very similar
situation in which it reached the opposite conclusion. 53

Distinguish-

49. 340 U.S. 534 (1951).
50.

Letter From Mr. Walter H. Beaman of the New York Bar to the Author, March

12, 1965.
51. Ibid.
52. Ibid.
53.

American Oil Co. v. Neill, 380 U.S. 451 (1965).
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ing GeneralMotors, the Court reversed the Supreme Court of Idaho
and held that Idaho could not levy a tax with respect to certain shipments into the state where the entire contract was negotiated and
executed without the state and title passed without the state, even
though the taxpayer had qualified to do business in the state and
was in fact doing business there. In this situation, the Court found
that there were no local activities connected with the taxed sales
and the local business had no connection with them.
The foregoing examples do not establish anything in themselves,
but are merely illustrative of the difficulty in applying the principles.54 Along the way some nice distinctions have been created,
although not always observed. A franchise tax measured by net income5" is constitutionally different from a tax on net income;"
and yet it seems obvious that their economic impact is exactly the
same. Similarly, the economics of sales57 and use" taxes are identical, as should be those of all other taxes measured by gross receipts59
or units of product or service, but the constitutional rules are very
different.
For present purposes, the significance of all this lies in the net
effect of uncertainty as to constitutional requirements, which when
superimposed upon the welter of statutory and regulatory definitions,
formulae, and requirements creates a compelling need for reform.
III.

A.

CONGRESSIONAL

ACTION

Developments Leading to Public Law 86-272.

Congress has exercised its powers under the commerce clause in
many fields with the approval of the Supreme Court.6" However,
Congress has moved cautiously in the field of state taxation, leaving
to the Supreme Court the task of protecting the national common
market from repressive local taxation.6 ' Indeed, until P.L. 86-272,2
54. Compare General Motors Corp. v. Washington, 377 U.S. 436 (1964), with Norton Co. v. Department of Revenue, 340 U.S. 534 (1951).
55. Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602 (1951).
56. Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 348 U.S. 450 (1959).
57. McLeod v. Dilworth Co., 322 U.S. 327 (1944).
58. General Trading Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 322 U.S. 335 (1944).
59. Norton Co. v. Department of Revenue, 340 U.S. 534 (1951).
60. E.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942), in which Congress was permitted
to limit the amount of grain a farmer could raise for his own use in furtherance of its
regulation of grain moving in interstate commerce.
61. The concern here is with interstate commerce and due process, not with what Congress has done to protect its own creatures, as for example in 42 Stat. 1499 (1923),
12 U.S.C. § 548 (1958), which limits the ways in which states may tax national banks,
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the few steps that Congress had taken were in enlargement rather
than curtailment of state taxing powers.
As noted previously, the Federal Unemployment Tax Act63
enacted in 1935 undertook specifically to subject interstate commerce to state taxation from which it might have been immune
under the Supreme Court's interpretations of the commerce clause
as a self-executing restraint. This provision was carried into the Internal Revenue Code which provides: "No person required under a
State law to make payments to an unemployment fund shall be relieved from compliance therewith on the ground that he is engaged
in interstate or foreign commerce, or that the State law does not
distinguish between employees engaged in interestate or foreign
commerce and those engaged in intrastate commerce."'
It is obvious that this was not intended as an aid to the states'
taxing power as such. Rather, it was to fill out the scheme for
unemployment compensation which was designed to force the states
to create and administer unemployment compensation funds.
With respect to the business of insurance, an unusual situation
developed. Congress had not undertaken to regulate insurance,
but in order to permit states to regulate insurance the Supreme
Court held in 1869 that insurance is not commerce.6" That doctrine was reaffirmed in many cases, as for example in 1913 when
it was used to permit a discriminatory local tax against a foreign
insurance company." Elaborate state regulatory and taxing schemes
were built upon that premise. Then, in 1944, the Court had to
consider whether associations of insurance companies could be
prosecuted for violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act. 7 The Sherman Act has its constitutional basis in Congress' power to regulate
interstate commerce. Hence, if insurance was not interstate commerce the indictments would fall; but if it was, existing state regulation and taxation would be destroyed. The Court held, four to
three, that insurance is interstate commerce.6 8
nor with congressional inducements to "voluntary" state action, as for example in employment taxes, INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 3303-05.
62. 73 Stat. 555 (1959), 15 U.S.C. § 381 (Supp. V, 1964).
63. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 3301-08.
64. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 3305 (a).
65. Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1869).
66. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Deer Lodge County, 231 U.S. 495 (1913).
67. 26 Star. 209 (1937), 15 U.S.C. 5 1 (1958).
68. United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944).

1965]

Barnes, Taxation of Interstate Commerce

Congress promptly adopted the McCarran Acte' by which it declared "that the continuing regulation and taxation by the several
States of the business of insurance is in the public interest, and that
silence on the part of the Congress shall not be construed to impose
any barrier to the regulation or taxation of such business by the
several States."7 In 1946, the Supreme Court held that a discriminatory tax on a foreign insurance company, which itassumed would
otherwise have been unconstitutional under the commerce clause,
had been validated by the act.'
By the McCarran Act, Congress came to the rescue of the states
for the first time in- the matter of their powers of taxation as such,
free from ties to any program which Congress itself sought to implement. Its motivation was to restore the status quo ante which
had been unsettled by the Supreme Court. It had not yet dealt
with any situation in which the states sought to extend their powers
into previously proscribed areas.
As state cigarette taxes grew in number and in burden, a substantial business in "bootlegging" cigarettes developed. Mail order
houses in states not having such taxes could sell cigarettes and pay
for mailing them to consumers in other states at substantial savings
under the cost of tax-paid cigarettes. The taxing states obviously
had no power to pursue the foreign vendors and had no practical
means of identifying the vendees so as to pursue them. In 1949,
Congress put an effective stop to this situation with the Jenkins
Act. 2 Section 376(a) of that act provides: "Any person who sells
or transfers for profit cigarettes in interstate commerce whereby such
cigarettes are shipped into a State taxing the sale or use of cigarettes
*.. shall ... file with the tobacco tax administrator of the State
into which such shipment is made, a memorandum or a copy of
the invoice covering each and every shipment of cigarettes
made . . . ."" Thus, Congress exerted its power to regulate interstate commerce to require vendors to give tax-collecting assistance
to states which due process prevented them from requiring them69. 59 Stat. 33 (1945), 15 U.S.C. S 1011-15 (1958).
70. 59 Star. 33 (1945), 15 U.S.C. § 1011 (1958).
71. Prudential Ins. Co. v.Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408 (1946). However, there isa
question as to whether the authority of this decision has been impaired by Reserve Life
Ins. Co. v.Bowers, 379 U.S. 810 (1964), reversing 119 Ohio App.251, 196 N.E.2d
114 (1963), which had upheld a discriminatory tax on foreign insurance companies.
See also State Bd. of Ins. v.Todd Shipyards Corp., 370 U.S. 451 (1962).
72. 63 Star 884 (1949), 15 U.S.C.5 375 (1958).
73. 63 Stat 884 (1949), 15 U.S.C. 5 376(a) (1958).
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selves. The Supreme Court affirmed a declaratory judgment of a
three-judge district court upholding the act."
In these three actions, Congress had used its power over interstate commerce in aid of state taxation: (1) to implement a Congressional program; (2) by disclaiming the power in limited
circumstances, to extricate the states from a court-created upheaval;
and (3) to do for the states what they could not constitutionally
do for themselves in a new tax area. It had not done anything to
restrict the states' exercise of their taxing powers. It had, however,
given the matter some thought. When in 1944 the Supreme Court
permitted Minnesota to levy a property tax, unapportioned, on
Northwest Airlines' entire fleet of airplanes, notwithstanding that
some of them had been taxed elsewhere,75 Congress directed the
Civil Aeronautics Board to investigate and recommend ways of
preventing such double taxation.76 In 1945, the Board recommended a federally-imposed uniform apportionment, but the bill
incorporating that recommendation did not pass either then or in
a second attempt four years later.
In 1959, the Supreme Court created another situation very similar to that of 1944: it held unequivocally that a state could tax
the net income of purely interstate commerce.77 Complaints from
business were so loud and numerous that Congress finally acted, this
time to impose a limitation upon the exercise of state taxing powers.7" Strictly as a stop-gap measure, it held the line at the Northwestern States decision, overruling Brown-Foreman and International Shoe.79 In addition to the call for a study of the entire
situation, the statute provides that states and their subdivisions may
not impose any tax on or measured by net income of a nondomiciliary taxpayer whose only business activities in the state are
74. Consumer Mail Order Ass'n v. McGrath, 340 U.S. 925 (1951), rehearingdenied,
341 U.S. 906 (1952).
75. Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292 (1944).
76. 58 Stat. 723 (1944), 49 U.S.C. § 425 (1958).
77. Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450 (1959).
78. The writer has never understood why the Northwestern States case has created
such consternation, for West Publishing Co. v. McColgan, 328 U.S. 823 (1946), had
held virtually the same thing in 1946. The surprising decisions were the Court's refusal to hear Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. Collector of Revenue, 234 La. 651, 101
So. 2d 70 (1958), cert. denied and appeal dismissed, 359 U.S. 28 (1959), and International Shoe Co. v. Fontenot, 236 La. 279, 107 So. 2d 640, cert. denied, 359 U.S. 984
(1959), where in each case the Supreme Court of Louisiana had held a company, which
had nothing in the state but traveling salesmen who solicited orders for acceptance and
shipment outside the state, subject to net income tax. While those decisions were part
of the background, it was the Northwestern States case that created most of the furor.
79. See note 78 supra.
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the solicitation of orders for goods, which orders are either to be
filled by the taxpayer from without the state or are turned over
to a customer of the taxpayer.8"
Looking at its language alone, P.L. 86-27281 might be interpreted to overrule the Northwestern States decision. However, the
legislative history indicates otherwise. As reported to the Senate
by the Finance Committee, the bill extended the prohibition to cases
in which the foreign vendor maintained an office in the state for
the primary purpose of serving the salesmen. Even an offer to
substitute "sole" for "primary" did not satisfy the opponents who
wanted any office to be deemed a sufficient "nexus" for tax. Accordingly, that section, which would have overruled the Northwestern
States decision, was deleted, leaving among decided cases only
Brown-Forman and International Shoe beyond the pale of the
statute.82 Thus, it is here that Congress has for the first time
undertaken actually to define the limits of state taxing power,
probably in exercise of its interstate commerce power, but also
possibly under its power to implement the fourteenth amendment.
B. Public Law 86-272 in the Courts
It is beyond question that in the exercise of its commerce clause
power Congress can override, supersede, or prohibit otherwise valid
state regulation. 3 It was inevitable, however, that the constitutionality of P.L. 86-272 would be challenged on the ground that whatever else Congress can do it cannot impair the fundamental attribute of sovereignty - the power to tax.84
1(1) The Tests of Constitutionality.-The earliest case involving P.L. 86-272 did not have to apply it directly, but rather used it
to reinforce a decision against the taxpayer.8" In that case, a taxpayer whose operations were all in Tennessee sought to apportion
part of its income to other states in which it had customers ("des80. 73 Star. 555 (1959), 15 U.S.C. 5 381 (Supp. V. 1964).

81. Ibid.
82. 105 CONG. REC. 14990, 15098, 15539, 16303 (1959).
83. Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945); South Carolina State
Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177 (1938).
84. Hearings on State Income Taxation of Mercantile and Manufacturing Corporations, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 20 (1961); Hearings on Sales and Use Taxes, 87th
Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 20a (1962); Roland, Public Law 86-272: Regulation or Raid,
46 VA. L REV. 1172 (1960); Wagner & Del Duca, Uniformity or Preferential Tax
Immunity for Multi-State Firms?, 48 A.B.Aj. 532 (1962).
85. Ownbey Co. v. Butler, 221 Tenn: 366, 365 S.W.2d 33 (1963).
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tination sales") but no substantial operations. The Supreme Court
of Tennessee held that Tennessee could tax its entire income for
the reason, among others, that P.L. 86-272 prevented any other
state from taxing any part thereof. Note that this treats P.L. 86-272
as an apportionment statute. If it were strictly a nexus statute as
it reads and as it has been held to be, the fact that it prohibited taxation by other states would have no bearing at all on the permissible tax base for Tennessee. The constitutionality of the statute
of course was not an issue.
The first test of constitutionality came in Louisiana in a case
that was carefully set up to present just that one issue." It was
agreed that under the earlier decision which the Supreme Court
had refused to review," the taxpayer had income subject to tax by
Louisiana and there was no dispute as to the amount. It was also
agreed that the taxpayer's activities in Louisiana were fully protected by the statute, thus eliminating any question of statutory
interpretation such as arose in later cases. The sole question was
whether Congress had the constitutional power to restrict state
taxation in circumstances to which the self-executing prohibitions
of the commerce clause did not extend. Briefs amicus were filed on
behalf of nineteen states urging that the statute be held unconstitutional and on behalf of forty trade associations urging its constitutionality - an indicator of the importance attached to the case.
The trial court held for the statute and the Supreme Court of
Louisiana unanimously affirmed. The principal argument for unconstitutionality was an ingenious one: since the Supreme Court
had indicated that taxing the net income derived from interstate
commerce is not taxing the commerce itself and hence is not a
regulation of it, a federal statute restricting state net income taxes
could not be a regulation of interstate commerce and hence not
within the commerce power of Congress. The court answered this
argument by saying that while "net income taxes are not to be
regarded, in the absence of action by Congress, either as a regulation of commerce or as burdening the free flow of commerce to
such an extent as to be violative of the commerce clause," Congress
nevertheless "retained plenary power to regulate [activities in
interstate commerce] by prohibiting the imposition of a state tax
when it determines such tax to unduly burden the free flow of such
86. International Shoe Co. v. Cocreham, 246 La. 348, 164 So. 2d 314, cert. denied
sub nom., Mouton v. International Shoe Co., 379 U.S. 902 (1964).
87. International Shoe Co. v. Fontenot, 236 La. 279, 107 So. 2d 640, cert. denied,
359 U.S. 984 (1959).
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commerce. '';8
The court also rejected arguments that because
Congress had not acted in this area in 170 years, its power to do
so had atrophied, and that the statute discriminated against intrastate
commerce in violation of the fifth amendment. This last argument
seems a strange one and hardly worth mentioning except that the
opponents of any federal regulation of state taxation urge it so
persistently. Apparently it stems from the fallacious concept that
the vendor "takes money out of the market" and should be required
to put some back by paying taxes to the jurisdiction in which his
customer is located merely because the customer is located there.
Since a Louisiana manufacturer of shoes which he sells to Louisiana
customers must pay tax to Louisiana on the income derived from
that business, a Missouri manufacturer of shoes who sells to Louisiana customers should pay tax to Louisiana on the income derived
from that business - lest the Louisiana manufacturer be competitively disadvantaged. The non sequitur is obvious. The Louisiana manufacturer owes tax to Louisiana not because his customers
are there, but because his plant and activities are there, receiving
the benefit of governmental services there. The Missouri manufacturer pays taxes for similar reasons to Missouri. The argument
would make sense with respect to tax on the consumer (sales or
use), but it makes none in the context of a tax on net income.
Net income is properly taxed where it is earned and arises, which
is to say where capital and labor are employed to produce it.89
It probably is not too much to say that this is the most important state tax case to have been presented to the Supreme Court
in 150 years. It was a perfectly "dean" case, presenting a single,
solid, novel constitutional issue. Representatives of many tax collectors and of many taxpayers urged the Court to decide it. Surely the
issue must be faced eventually. In fact, at the present time a subcommittee of Congress is considering an expansion of P.L. 86-272 and
it would presumably welcome any such guidance. Why then did
the Court refuse to consider it? Several inferences are possible:
(1) the Court was satisfied with the decision below and saw no
occasion to spend further time on it; (2) the Court found the
subject so delicate that it did not want to deal with it until it had to,
or until a larger body of lower court decisions had developed; (3)
the Court, knowing it would eventually have to interpret the statute
88.

International Shoe Co. v. Cocreham, 246 La. 348, 164 So. 2d 314, cert dened

sub nom., Mouton v. International Shoe Co., 379 U.S. 902 (1964).

89. Stratton's Independence, Ltd. v. Howbert, 231 U.S. 399 (1913).

WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 16:859

as well as consider its constitutionality, preferred to wait for a case
that was less clear-cut; and there may be others. The writer
prefers, however, to draw no inference at all.
The next case to test P.L. 86-272 required an interpretation of
the law as well as a determination of its constitutionality." The
taxpayer manufactured drugs in New Jersey and sold them to
druggists in Missouri where it had twelve resident salesmen but
no offices. The State Tax Commission decided that P.L. 86-272
did not apply because the taxpayer's activities went beyond the
minimum (solicitation of orders) protected by the act in that: (1)
the salesmen did missionary work with doctors to get them to prescribe the drugs - promoting the intrastate business of the druggists; (2) the residences of the salesmen, their company-owned
automobiles, and their personally owned property invoked the exception that P.L. 86-272 does not apply to domiciliaries; (3) sales
meetings were held in Missouri; and (4) CIBA Pharmaceutical
Company had qualified as a foreign corporation, thus becoming a
domiciliary.
The trial court found all the activities to be within the statutory
protection and gave judgfhent for the taxpayer without considering
the question of constitutionality. The Missouri Supreme Court
unanimously affirmed. It held that all the described activities were
within the category protected by the statute. The promotion work
with doctors, the sales meetings, the use of automobiles were all in
furtherance of the interstate sales to the druggists.9 '
On the constitutional issue, the State Tax Commission, supported again by representatives of several other states, made the
same principal argument that had been made in Louisiana. In
response, the court concluded: "In adopting Public Law 86-272
Congress is clearly, in our opinion, undertaking to regulate interstate commerce by providing a uniform statement of the facts, circumstances and conditions under which a state may not burden
interstate commerce by state income taxes where the activities of
the corporation in a foreign state do not exceed the minimum

90.

State ex rel. CIBA Pharmaceutical Prods., Inc. v. State Tax Comm'n, 382 S.W.2d

645 (Mo. 1964).
91. In so holding, the court distinguished Eli Lilly & Co. v. Say-on-Drugs, Inc., 366
U.S. 276 (1961).
Although the Missouri court did not mention it, the most important distinction seems to be that Eli Lilly was not a tax case, but rather involved a
question of "doing business" so as to be required to qualify.
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standard set up in the act."92 Thus, the argument of discrimination
against intrastate commerce received the short shrift it deserves.
The scene then shifted to Oregon. The facts in a case here
were substantially identical to those in CIBA Pharmaceutical.
The State Tax Commission supported its assessments on the twin
grounds that the taxpayer's activities were not within the protected
area and that the statute was unconstitutional. On the first point,
the Tax Court found, as had the Missouri court, that "Congress
intended to exempt not only the specifically described phase [actual
solicitation of orders] of interstate sales efforts but also all lesser,
included phases.""3 Sales promotion is merely a form of sales solicitation.
Having crossed that bridge in the same manner as the Missouri
court, the Oregon court approached the constitutional question,
and, aided again by the amid curiae representing various states,
adopted the principal argument made unsuccessfully to the Supreme
Courts of Louisiana and Missouri. Stated differently, the argument
was that although P.L. 86-272 is not a legislative attempt to define
due process, which is a judicial function, it fails as a regulation of
interstate commerce. In a brilliant analysis of the distinctions between a franchise tax measured by net income" and a tax laid
directly upon net income"5 the court stated: "[Tlhe logical and
practical conclusion is that, by its nature, a net income tax is not
imposed on interstate commerce but upon the profits of a business
after the proceeds of its commerce have left interstate commerce."
"Because the burden of a net income tax is not on that commerce which Congress may preempt or otherwise regulate, the distinction between undue burdens and due burdens permitted until
Congress acts is inapplicable. Congress' power to prohibit state
taxation terminates when the limits of interstate commerce are
reached." 6
The real concern of the Oregon Tax Court was with fundamental principles of federalism: "If, as interstate commerce Congress can prohibit a state tax on net income derived from interstate
92.

State ex rel. CIBA Pharmaceutical Prods., Inc. v. State Tax Comm'n, 382 S.W.2d

645 (Mo. 1964).
93. Smith, Kline & French Labs. v. State Tax Comm'n, 5 CCH STATE TAX CAS.
REP.9 250,116 (Ore. April 24, 1964).
94. Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602 (1951).
95. Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450 (1959).
96. Smith, Kline & French Labs. v. State Tax Comm'n, 5 CCH STATE TAX. CAS. REP.
5 250,116 (Ore. April 24, 1964).
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commerce, then, Congress can prohibit all state taxation under its
broad power to regulate intrastate affairs affecting interstate commerce."9T Congress could, said the court, validly impose a uniform
apportionment formula to prevent overlapping taxation, but P.L.
86-272 is not such a statute. It provides that "no state shall have
power," and creates an exemption. Thus, the decision was in effect
an invitation to Congress to achieve the same result by using different words." Had that decision survived the appeal to the Oregon
Supreme Court, it would virtually have forced the United States
Supreme Court to settle the issue. After affirming the Tax Court's
holding that the taxpayer's activities were within the protection of
the statute, the Supreme Court of Oregon went on to hold the
statute constitutional. It found an area of "overlap" of the powers
of states to legislate matters affecting interstate commerce in the
absence of congressional action and the powers of Congress in the
exercise of its delegated authority to override such legislation. "In
Northwestern Cement the Court simply held that a state income
tax upon revenues derived from interstate commerce 'does not
offend constitutional limitations upon state interference with such
commerce.' The Court was deciding the extent of the restrictions
imposed by the unexercised delegation of power made by the Commerce Clause. In the instant case the power delegated has been
exercised." 9
(2) Interpretations of Nexus.-Viewing P.L. 86-272 as a
nexus rule rather than an apportionment rule, an interesting and far
from academic question arises. There are two kinds of nexus: jurisdiction over the person of the taxpayer, and jurisdiction over the
transaction taxed. Jurisdiction is a due process problem, and yet in
enacting P.L. 86-272 Congress apparently relied entirely upon its
commerce power rather than its power under the fifth section of the
fourteenth amendment to implement due process. The three cases
discussed above all looked solely to the commerce power.
It is clear that in any taxing situation the state must have jurisdiction over either the person or the transaction, but it is not clear
which. In the unemployment tax case, the state had jurisdiction
over the transaction (employees earning commissions in the state),
97. Ibid.
98. Instead of providing that "no state shall have power to tax" under certain circumstances, Congress might say that under such circumstances, "all income is apportioned
to the home state." This, it seems to this writer, is a distinction without a difference.
Ownbey Co. v. Butler, 221 Tenn. 366, 365 S.W.2d 33 (1963).
99. Smith, Kline & French Labs. v. Oregon Tax Comm'n, 1 P-H STATE & LOCAL TAX
SEr. 5 92,108 (Ore. Sup. Ct.June 16, 1965).

1965]

Barnes, Taxation of Interstate Commerce

but not in the traditional sense over the taxpayer." 0 The Supreme
Court transmuted the jurisdiction in the nature of in rer to in
personam to the extent of permitting the state to sue the taxpayer
with respect to that transaction. There was no hint that International Shoe could have been sued in Washington on any other account.
More often, however, jurisdiction over the person seems to be
sufficient. If such jurisdiction exists for any reason, the state can tax
transactions over which it has no direct jurisdiction, 1 ' except that
sometimes a purely interstate transaction will escape even though
the taxpayer is admittedly present through other transactions."0 2
The question under P.L. 86-272 is whether transactions which
in themselves are dearly entitled to the protection of the statute lose
that immunity if the taxpayer has other contacts with the state
which are not so protected. To date, at least two cases have presented that issue without conclusive result. In United States Steel
Corp. v. Undercofler,"°3 the point, unfortunately, probably did not
arise directly because the assessments may have been made before
the effective date of P.L. 86-272, and hence was not considered by
the court. The taxpayer, United States Steel Corporation, operated
a diversified steel business through fourteen separate divisions, each
of which dealt in products largely peculiar to itself. Several of these
divisions did business in Georgia: the American Bridge Division engaged in construction contracting; the American Steel and Wire Division sold and installed fencing; the National Tube Division sold
pipe. At issue were the activities of the Tennessee Coal and Iron
Division which shipped tinplate and rails to customers at Georgia
locations pursuant to contracts solicited and negotiated outside
Georgia. The division had no offices in Georgia. The court held
that the gross receipts from these sales had to be assigned to Georgia
because "it is the receipt of money.., that produces income,""4' ' and
because of the presence of other, admittedly taxable, activities, relying for this latter point on General Motors Corp. v.Washington.'
100. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
101. General Motors Corp. v. Washington, 377 U.S. 436 (1963), in which the taxed
transactions were wholly without the jurisdiction, but were nevertheless held taxable,
apparently because the taxpayer engaged in other admittedly taxable business in the state.
102. Norton Co. v. Department of Revenue, 340 U.S. 534 (1951). There is a question, however, as to whether this has been overruled by General Motors.
103. United States Steel Corp. v. Undercofler, 220 Ga. 553, 140 S.F-2d 269 (1965).
104. Id. at 563, 140 SXE.2d at 277.
105. 377 U.S. 436 (1963).
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In the other case," 6 the point was strongly urged under facts
similar to those in United States Steel Corp. v. Undercofler,0 7 but
the statute was held inapplicable. If the protection was lost because of unrelated activities, a question of unconstitutional discrimination is now raised. Compare the taxpayer's position with that of
a competitor who has the same transactions as those taxed, but not
the unrelated activities.0 8 The court avoided the argument, and
this point was not carried to the Supreme Court where other aspects
of the case were argued.0 9
There is nothing in the wording of P.L. 86-272 nor in its legislative history to suggest that Congress contemplated the United
States Steel Corp. and General Motors type of situation. Rather, it
seems that the all-or-nothing circumstances of International Shoe,
CIBA Pharmaceutical,and Smith, Kline & French received all the
attention. Whether the statute will be interpreted to apply separately to segments, or whether constitutional considerations will
force such an interpretation, will be for determination in later litigation.
IV.

A

CONCEIVABLE FEDERAL STATUTE

The Congressional Report reveals a chaotic condition throughout state and local taxation of multistate business, and concludes
that Congress should do something about it."0 To that end, the
Special Subcommittee will almost surely recommend a federal statute to regulate such taxation. Whatever its content, it will be heatedly opposed by some state tax administrators, even though it may
be as much for their benefit as for that of business. The more comprehensive the proposal, the more difference of opinion will be generated as to specific provisions within such groups as taxpayer representatives, tax administrators, and academicians.
A.

Outline of the Structure

The Special Subcommittee's proposal will probably be more
comprehensive than P.L. 86-272, but it is very unlikely to cover the
106. General Motors Corp. v. District of Columbia, 336 F.2d 885, modified, 336
F.2d 904 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
107. Cf. Hamilton Nat'l Bank v. District of Columbia, 176 F.2d 624 (D.C Cir. 1949);
Concordia Fire Ins. Co. v. Illinois, 292 U.S. 535 (1934); Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia,
253 U.S. 412 (1920).
108. See note 103 supra.
109. General Motors Corp. v. District of Columbia, 380 U.S. 553 (1965).
110. H.R. REP. No. 1480, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964).
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entire field in any such ambitious manner as is suggested in the outline below. Almost surely it will prescribe one or more formulae
for the apportionment of income; and probably there will be some
rules governing liability for collecting use and other taxes imposed
upon others.
The following outline represents in a general way the possible
structure of an all-inclusive federal statute regulating state and local
taxation of multistate business. Although it is perhaps much more
elaborate than can be expected of an actual enactment, it may serve
to describe the perimeter of the field and the interrelation of the aspects of the problem, only some of which are likely to be selected
for statutory attention.,
(1) Findings.-The setting for the legislation ought to include
the findings of the Special Subcommittee as an aid to its subsequent
interpretation. Based primarily upon the Congressional Special Subcommittee's Report, 1 this section would note the growing economic
impact of state and local taxes, describe the chaotic conditions causing unreasonable burdens on taxpayers, administrators, and courts,
and recite the economic bases and incidences of various types of
taxes.
(2) Definitions.-The important definitions in such a -statute
would be: (1) "state," which includes subdivisions; (2) "taxes,"
which includes all governmental charges and requirements for collecting taxes from others; and (3) "enterprise," which includes
every businessexcept that of being an employee.
(3) Declaration of Policy.-This declaration should not be
directory, but rather a statement of objectives to assist in applying
the directory provisions, including: (1) multistate business must
"pay its own way" and accept the same burdens as local business in
each locality; (2) multistate business should not be subject to burdens not imposed upon local business; (3) states should not tax
values outside their territorial jurisdictions; (4) collection of taxes
of others should be properly compensated and involuntary collectors
should be given some protection against innocent mistakes; and
(5) business should assist in collection of taxes which it is genuinely difficult for administrators to collect, as by being required to report transactions to states having no jurisdiction to impose such a
requirement.
(4) Prohibition of State Taxation of Multistate Business Except as Expressly Permitted.-Permittedtypes of taxes, subject to del11. Ibid.
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tails later prescribed, would include: (1) taxes on or measured by
net income, without distinction; (2) ad valorem taxes; (3) the
duty to collect taxes, in some cases, imposed upon others, and in
other cases to report transactions so that tax administrators could
pursue the taxpayer directly; (4) use tax, including in that term all
taxes on or measured by gross receipts, or by units of goods or services; (5) personal income tax; (6) value-added tax; (7) fees and
charges for special services; (8) capital tax; (9) severance tax; and
(10) social security taxes, and perhaps others. It would be required
that taxes be equal for all, including the state, in the same business.
(5) Tax on or Measured by Net Income.-Net income would
be defined by reference to the Internal Revenue Code, with adjustments, the principal problem being to make appropriate provision for transition where there have been substantial deviations
in matters of timing, such as in depreciation and in installment sales.
A uniform apportionment formula would be prescribed, or perhaps
more than one to accommodate particular industries. A universal
formula would be possible if some variation were prescribed in
one or more of the factors. The most likely formula would be
based on property and payroll, perhaps combined, by converting
property to rental value, into a single fraction to achieve automatic
weighting. A third factor of sales, presumably assigned to permanent establishments, but possibly to "destination," might be permissive provided that no enterprise had its tax increased thereby. Thus,
while a state would not be permitted to penalize imports, it could
if it wished subsidize exports. It is very important that a twofactor formula of property and payroll not be rigidly imposed, because without other adjustments, such as to rates, serious dislocations would be caused. Another likely formula would have three
factors of property, payroll, and sales, but the sales would not be
assigned to "destination" because of the lack of economic justification for so doing and the impossible problems of compliance and
administration which such a procedure would create.
Payroll would be assigned either to permanent establishments
or by reference to unemployment taxes, and could be the same
for all businesses. The content of the property factor would need
a few variations to achieve a meaningful measure for all industries. For manufacturing, construction, and many other industries, only capital goods would need to be included. In mercantile
enterprises, inventory is too important a factor to be omitted. In
financial enterprises, tangible property is insignificant, while in-
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tangibles are the principal income-producing factor. In transportation, ton-miles, or pick-ups and discharges, avoid the problem of
fixing the location of moving equipment.
One of the adjustments which might be made to "federal" income to determine apportionable net income would be to add back
all state taxes. After the apportionment, the ad valorem and other
taxes paid to each state, and its subdivisions, would be deducted
from the income apportioned to that state. A similar provision
might be made for tax-exempt interest.
(6) Discrimination.-Protectionagainst discrimination in ad
valorem taxes, a problem for railroads, manufacturers, merchants,
and public utilities, ought to be included.
(7) Collecting Taxes Imposed Upon Others.-This is the
most difficult problem of all, because here and only here there
is a genuine conflict of interest between the professional collectors and the involuntary ones, and because of the extreme difficulty of devising an appropriate scale of compensation. The
power to impose such a requirement would be limited to instances
in which the transaction, as distinguished from the person of the
collector, is within the jurisdiction, and reasonable compensation
would be required. Several statutes now provide for compensation,
but all are based on percentages of tax collected and are completely unsatisfactory. A given percentage may be gross underpayment in a case of numerous small transactions and a gross overpayment in a case of a few large transactions. A satisfactory scale
would be tied directly to the amount of work required, e.g., a stated
amount for each return filed, or for each item reported. The
principle of the Jenkins Act,' which requires reporting of interstate shipments of cigarettes, would be extended to apply to shipments of all goods when requested. This for the first time would
give the states a means of enforcing a use tax on mail order purchases.
(8) Taxes Measured by Gross Receipts or by Units of Goods
or Services.-Since all of these taxes are almost universally passed
on to the purchaser in the particular transaction, as for example
where cigarette prices are higher in one state than in another by the
precise amount of the difference in the cigarette tax rates, all such
taxes would be deemed not only to be paid by, but to be imposed
upon, the purchaser, i.e., to be "use" taxes, regardless of their statutory description as franchise taxes on the seller or otherwise. As
112.

See note 72 supra and accompanying text.
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such, they could be imposed only with respect to use within the jurisdiction and would be subject to the rules governing requirements for
collection. The principal problems occur in dealing with property,
such as construction equipment, that is moved from one jurisdiction
to another, and with sale for use in another jurisdiction when delivery is taken in the jurisdiction of sale. These are not insurmountable.
(9) Value Added.-This is the amount remaining after subtracting the value of purchases and imports from the value of sales
and exports. This type of tax, not currently in use, would be offered
as a substitute for the gross-receipts-franchise taxes now imposed by
a few jurisdictions. In effect, gross receipts would be taxable to the
extent generated by activities in the jurisdiction. In most cases, the
books of the enterprise would furnish the figures directly, but in
some instances an apportionment would be necessary. This could
be done with the same sort of property-payroll formula used for
income apportionment.
(10) Fees for Special Services.-Such fees would be excluded
from coverage, except to confine them to charges which actually
pay only for such services. Examples are gasoline taxes exclusively
for highway construction and maintenance, and incorporation, qualification, registration, and license fees exclusively to support supervisory agencies.
(11) Capital Tax.-Capital would be defined and apportionment would be on the basis of location of property.
(12) Personal Income Tax.-This tax may be imposed on
residents as such, but only in addition to, and not in lieu of, any
taxes for which an individual may be liable as an enterprise.
(13) Administrative Provisions.-Minimum rules of fairness
in administrative matters would be included. They would require
adequate taxpayer remedies, a reasonable statute of limitations in
all cases except fraud, limitations and interest with respect to refunds equal to those applicable to deficiencies, and protection for
good faith reliance on statements, such as exemption certificates,
of other taxpayers. These rules would provide for adjustment
of transactions not at arm's length, but with protection to taxpayers
caught between inconsistent adjustments by two or more taxing
jurisdictions.
It can be seen from the foregoing outline that such a statute
would greatly benefit both taxpayers and tax administrators. By
cutting down the number of jurisdictions to which a taxpayer would
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have to report, costs of compliance and administration would be
reduced'making possible more nearly complete enforcement. By
eliminating the distinction between "on net income" and "measured
by net income," states would be permitted to tax interstate, commerce without regard to labels 13 and without omitring federal
interest. The burden of collecting taxes imposed upon others would
be reduced and states would be given the means they do not now
have for collecting such taxes. The statute would not interfere with
rates of tax nor limit revenues, but it would prevent discrimination
against foreigners. A few -

but very few -

taxes now imposed

would have to be changed. An example is St. Louis' gross receipts
tax, 4 which would have to be limited either to receipts from sales
to St. Louis residents (use tax), or the portion of receipts generated
by activities in St. Louis (value added tax), or both.
Would Such a Statute Be Constitutional?
Whether or not an act of Congress contravenes the Constitution
is a question for the Supreme Court." 5 Speculation thereon by
any lawyer is rash, but there are guides upon which to base such
speculation. In this case, those guides suggest strongly that a
statute as outlined above to regulate state and local taxation of multistate business would be held constitutional, at least in its major provisions. The discussion above of "P.L. 86-272 in the Courts" is some
support for this conclusion."' There are also the numerous asides
by several Supreme Court Justices to the effect that the problem is
legislative rather than judicial, and that Congress has and should
exercisethe power to define the limits of state taxation of interstate
commerce."' Probably the dearest expression of this view, from
which there is no recorded judicial dissent, is Mr. Justice Frankf rter's dissent in Northwestern States PortlandCement Co. v. Minnesota"!8 in which he said:
B.

113.
114.

Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602 (1951).
American Mfg. Co. v. St. Louis, 250 U.S. 459 (1919).

115. Much of the material in this section is drawn from a thorough study of the area
made by Leslie M. Swope of the Pennsylvania Bar in 1963. (unpublished).
116. See text at pp. 875-82 supra.
117. See, e~g., State Bd. of Ins. v. Todd Shipyards Corp., 370 U.S. 451 (1962) (Douglas, J.); Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450 (1959)
(Clark, Frankfurter, Whittaker, JJ.); Freeman v. Hewitt, 329 U.S. 249 (1946)
(Frankfurter, J.); Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408 (1964) (Rutledge,
J.); Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1941) (Stone, J.); Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292 (1944) (Jackson, J.); South Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177 (1938) (Stone, J.).
118. 358 U.S. 450 (1959).
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The problem calls for solution by divising a congressional
policy. Congress alone can provide for a full and thorough
canvassing of the multitudinous and intricate factors which compose the taxing freedom of the States and the needed limits on
such state taxing power. Congressional committees can make
studies and give the claims of the individual States adequate hearing before the ultimate legislative formulation of policy is made
by the representatives of all the States. The solution to these
problems ought not to rest on the self-serving determinations of
the States of what they are entitled to out of the Nation's resources. Congress alone can formulate policies founded upon
economic realities, perhaps to be applied to the myriad situations
involved by a properly constituted and duly informed administrative agency." 9
The best summary of this attitude appears in the following comment: "There is only one proposition upon which all the justices
... both those who would narrowly restrict the states' taxing power

and those who would give it the greatest breadth possible... would
seem to be in accord, and that is that Congress should undertake to
define the areas within which the state taxing powers are permissible and within which they are forbidden."' 20
There is no doubt that Congress can, in the exercise of any of
its delegated powers, supersede otherwise valid state regulation."'
It is equally dear that Congress can prevent state interference by
taxation with Congressional objectives in at least some areas. Thus,
under its power to regulate money, Congress can and has limited
and prohibited state taxation of privately owned but federally incorporated financial enterprises.'2 2 It is firmly established also that
under its power to regulate interstate commerce, Congress can regulate matters which are not themselves interstate commerce, but
which merely affect it, though even remotely.'2 3 It should follow,
119. Id. at 476-77.
120. Rosenberg, Interstate Commerce: To What Extent May Congress Define the
Areas of State and Local Taxation? (paper presented to the ABA Committee on State
and Local Taxes in 1956).
121. E.g., South Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177 (1938).
122. See, e.g., 38 Stat. 258 (1913), 12 U.S.C. § 531 (1958) (Federal Reserve Banks);
42 Stat. 1499 (1923), 12 U.S.C. § 548 (1958) (National Banks); 39 Stat. 380 (1916),
12 U.S.C. § 931 (1958) (Federal Land Banks).
123. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S.
100 (1941); Currin v. Wallace, 306 U.S. 1 (1939); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937). But cf. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
Strongest of the recent pronouncements is Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964);
Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964). In Katzenbach,
it was held that Congress could require a local restaurant to serve Negro customers because a substantial part of its meat supply had been purchased from a local supplier who
in turn had acquired it through interstate commerce. For a further discussion of these
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although it has not yet been expressly decided by the Supreme Court,
that Congress can limit or even prohibit state taxation of interstate
commerce or matters which Congress determines to have an effect
upon interstate commerce.
The next question is whether Congress can limit or prohibit a
state tax which the Supreme Court has held valid in the absence of
Congressional action, or whether it can permit a state tax which the
Supreme Court has held invalid in the absence of Congressional action. Here the answer should be a confident "yes." The first clear
instance of Supreme Court approval appears to have occurred in
1856. In 1852, the Court had held a certain bridge to be an obCongress
struction to navigation, and ordered its removal."
promptly adopted an act declaring the bridge to be a "lawful structure.' 'i=Z The Supreme Court then concluded that although the
bridge "still may be an obstruction in fact," by reason of the act of
Congress it had ceased to be such "in the contemplation of law."12
That principle was later applied in a tax case in which the Court
sustained a state tax discriminating against interstate commerce because Congress had permitted it.1'7 The Court said the controlling
cases "are the ones involving situations where the silence of Congress or the dormancy of its power has been taken judicially, on one
view or another of its constitutional effects, as forbidding state action, only to have Congress later disclaim the prohibition or undertake to nullify it. Not yet has this Court held such- a disclaimer invalid or that state action supported by it could not stand. On the
contrary, in each instance it has given effect to congressional judgment contradicting its own previous one."128
The invalidity of the tax in that case would have resulted, but
for the congressional action, from the commerce clause. An instance in which Congress used its commerce clause power to require
a reporting for tax purposes which the states could not have required
without violating due process occurred in the Jenkins Act 29 which
cases see Note, Public Accommodations: A- Justification of Title 11 of The Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 16 W. REs. L. REv. 660 (1965).
124. Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 54 U.S. (13 How.) 518
(1852).
125. Act of August 31, 1852, 10 Stat. 112.
126. Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 421
(1855).
127. Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408 (1946).
128. Id. at 423-24.
129. See note 72 supra.
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required the reporting of interstate shipments of cigarettes. As
noted previously, these provisions have been upheld."' .
These decisions make it dear enough that Congress 'can permit
an otherwise invalid tax. To date, there are only dicta to support
the corollary that Congress, solely as a regulation of interstate commerce, can prohibit an otherwise valid tax - but the dicta are
strong. An example is Mr. Justice Jackson's concurring opinion
upholding the tax in Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Minnesota'3 '
wherein he said of Congress: "It may exact a single uniform federal
tax on the property or the business to the exclusion of taxation by
the states. It may subject the vehicles or other incidents to any
type of state and local taxation, or it may declare them tax-free
altogether."' 32
No doubt Congress must be reasonable in use of its commerce
power to impose restraints on state taxation. While the cases support a strong inference that Congress has such power in the abstract
and can apply it very broadly, there is still the question as to whether
each specific enactment is within the power. The statute outlined
above seems to meet any test of reasonableness that is likely to be
applied to an act of Congress. Its impact on state revenues is
minimal and is in fact as likely to increase them as to diminish
them. Its most important provisions - prescribing a uniform
formula for the apportionment of net income and limiting liability
for the collection of taxes from others - seem dearly to be proper
regulation and protection.
At least passing consideration should be given to the' due
process clause which Congress is authorized to implement by
statute. 3 ' If, as seems unlikely, there is some business so local that a
congressional finding that a tax on it "affects" interstate commerce
could not stand, the question arises whether Congress could effectively declare that such a tax denies due process. Otherwise stated,
a phase of the question is whether Congress can, through due
process, confine municipalities to their own territories and prevent
their discrimination against inter-municipal commerce which does
not cross state lines."' This is essentially a matter of defining due
130. See note 74 supra.
131. 322 U.S. 292 (1944).
132. Id. at 303-04.
133. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
134. Compare Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Reily, 373 U.S. 64 (1963),
with Spatt v. City of New York, 13 N.Y.2d 618, 191 N.E.2d 91, appeal dismissed, 375
U.S. 394 (1964). In Halliburton, the Supreme Court invalidated a use tax that was
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process. The cases dealing with congressional action under the
fourteenth- amendment suggest that Congress' power with respect
thereto is limited to such things as providing remedies for what the
Supreme Court determines to be denial of due process, and does not
include determining what constitutes due process."' 8
It is sometimes suggested that a most valuable aid to protecting
taxpayers from unreasonable exactions would be to give them
access to federal courts. The eleventh amendment provides that
"the Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to
extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against
one of the United States by Citizens of another State ...."6 It has
been held to proscribe taxpayer suits against state officials as well
as against the states themselves. 13 7 For this reason, the statute outlined above omits any attempt to confer federal court jurisdiction.
V.

CONCLUSION

Improvement of transportation and communication have led to
increased integration of our national economy and growth of interstate commerce - a growth more rapid than the expansion of the
economy as a whole. Revenue demands of governments at all
levels have expanded even more rapidly, so that state and local
tax burdens have become proportionately greater, leading to administrative extension of old tax laws and the addition of new
legislation. The laws and practices of the states and their subdivisions are overwhelming in their diverse requirements of multistate business for filing reports, keeping records, and otherwise complying with the tax laws. In many cases, they are impossible of
full enforcement and indeed, to a substantial extent they are not
enforced.
As burdens become heavier, inequities which could formerly be
ignored as de minimis become major problems. The long process
of litigation and eventual decision by the United States Supreme
higher than a sales tax would have been had the transaction been intrastate, as a discrimination against interstate commerce. The circumstances were identical in Spatt,
except that the transaction was over city lines rather than state lines, and the Supreme
Court allowed New York's refusal to invalidate the tax to stand. In Halliburton, the
Supreme Court said that the inducement to keep commerce local was an improper objective. In Spatt, the New York court said the inducement to keep commerce local was
a valid reason for the difference between the sales and use taxes.
135. E.g., Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167 (1961); Ex parte Virginia, 100 U. S. 339
(1879); cf. State Bd. of Ins. v. Todd Shipyards Corp., 370 U.S. 451 (1962).
136. US. CONST. amend. XI.
137. Worcester Trust Co. v. Riley, 302 U.S. 292, 300 (1937).
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Court is wholly inadequate to supply the remedy. Indeed, much
confusion results from the difficulty of ascertaining the principles
established by the Court and the still greater difficulty of applying
any such principles to concrete facts. The cure must therefore lie
in legislation; and, since the states have shown almost no inclination
to deal constructively with the problem, the need for federal legislation becomes apparent. Congress could define income, prescribe the
method of its apportionment, prescribe the conditions under which
business may be required to collect taxes from others, require business to aid states in collecting by reporting transactions, prohibit
some kinds of taxes, and limit or regulate all others. All of these
appear to be well within Congress' power to regulate interstate
commerce, which includes the power to regulate matters affecting
interstate commerce.

